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One of the dramatic changes in the area of employee benefit plans
created by the passage of the federal Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 19741 was the imposition of express statutory standards
especially governing the conduct of employee benefit plan "fiducia-
ries."' 2 It has been widely assumed that these new standards represent a
strict departure from the traditional, common law rules governing trust
fiduciaries. Moreover, publicity has increased the awareness of these
standards by potential litigants. As a result, fiduciaries would be wise
to reexamine their conduct in light of the increased liability risks.
The basic statutory rules of conduct for plan fiduciaries are stated
only in the most general terms in section 404(a) of the Act.3 Unfortu-
nately, in the more than five years that have elapsed since the passage
of ERISA, despite much unofficial speculation, little official direction
has emerged to clarify those standards. Neither judicial rulings,4 nor
regulations from the United States Department of Labor,5 which is
charged with the responsibility of administering the fiduciary standards
of ERISA,6 have allayed the fiduciaries' concerns.
The problem is particularly acute with respect to the small, single-
* Richard W. Laner, J.D., Northwestern University, and Alan M. Levin, J.D., University
of Chicago, practice law in Chicago with the firm of Dorfman, Cohen, Laner & Muchin, who
exclusively specialize in the representation of management in all aspects of management-labor
relations.
i. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) and various other
chapters of the United States Code) [hereinafter referred to either as ERISA or the Act].
2. The standards are found in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1976). "Fiduciaries," under the Act, is a
category generally including all individuals responsible for the administration of benefit plans and
the disposition of plan funds. Id § 1002(21)(A).
3. Section 404(a) of ERISA provides in pertinent part:
a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and-
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevail-
ing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use
in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims. ...
Id § 1104(a)(l) (emphasis added).
4. See text accompanying notes 75-78 infra.
5. The most recent regulations attempting to clarify the standards became effective July 23,
1979. See 29 C.F.R. § 2 550.404a-1 to .414c-4 (1979).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (1976).
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employer retirement plan fiduciary, who typically has neither the re-
sources nor the experience normally associated with the institutional or
professional plan trustee or administrator. Consider the example of a
single-employer defined contribution (individual account) retirement
plan,7 such as a small profit-sharing plan. Here, typically, administra-
tors and/or trustees of such plans are drawn from the executives
and/or owners of the employer sponsoring the plan. Such a single-
employer, defined contribution plan fiduciary charged with the respon-
sibility of managing plan assets is likely to have the greatest potential
risk exposure. The benefits to be derived by the participants are not
determined by a pre-set formula where the employer makes contribu-
tions according to periodic, actuarial determinations. Rather, benefits
are solely dependent upon the size of the participants' individual ac-
counts. Because individual plan participants or beneficiaries may exer-
cise their right under ERISA to bring a federal lawsuit to enforce the
fiduciary standards or the terms of the plan, enjoin violations thereof,
or obtain other relief,8 the risk that dwindling account balances or less
than satisfactory account growth experience could trigger litigation by
disgruntled participants is readily apparent. Such litigation could re-
sult in personal liability for the fiduciary,9 and exculpatory provisions
in plan documents are deemed void.10
This article will analyze the basic standards of fiduciary duty
under ERISA and discuss the few guidelines which have emerged to
interpret the statute. In addition, some possible solutions suited to the
needs of fiduciaries of small retirement plans will be suggested, particu-
7. The term "individual account plan" or "defined contribution plan" means a pension plan
which provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon
the amount contributed to the participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains, and losses,
and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such participant's
account. 29 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1976). The Secretary of Labor may bring suit as well. Id.
9. Section 409(a) of ERISA provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the re-
sponsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be person-
ally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made
through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of
such fiduciary.
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1976).
10. Section 410(a) of ERISA provides:
Except as provided in sections 405(b)(1) and 405(d) [relating to specific allocation or
delegation of fiduciary duties], any provision in an agreement or instrument which pur-
ports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obliga-
tion, or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy.
Id. § 1110(a).
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larly those designed to invest in employer stock.II
THE "SOLE INTEREST" TEST
The "sole interest" requirement under ERISA mandates that a
fiduciary discharge his duties solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries. 12 While the provision appears straightforward, ap-
plied literally, the section poses problems for the plan fiduciary.
For example, consider the trustee or administrator who wears "two
hats"-simultaneously serving as a fiduciary and a full-time officer, di-
rector, or other agent of the employer who sponsors the plan.13 The
same may be true where the status as plan fiduciary is less formal, such
as where the administrator is subject to the direction of the employer,
officers, and/or directors.
It is well-established that corporate directors stand in a fiduciary
relationship to the corporation and its shareholders.14 Moreover,
where an eligible individual account plan is itself a major shareholder
of the employer, the plan itself, as shareholder, and those who adminis-
ter it may be considered to bear a fiduciary duty towards the corpora-
1i. The leading appellate case to date applying ERISA's fiduciary rules involved a small
plan designed to hold employer securities. See Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978),
discussed in text accompanying notes 75-78 infra. See also Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341
(W.D. Okla. 1978) (also involved a small plan and claims of naked self-dealing by the employer).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1976). It should be noted that the "sole interest" test applies
independently of the prudence requirement which is discussed in the text accompanying notes 29-
60 infra. See Hutchinson, Prudent Pension Investments Evaluated by "Whole Portfolio," NAT'L.
L.J. 23, 29 (June 26, 1979) [hereinafter referred to as Hutchinson].
We do not discuss herein the ramifications of the "exclusive purpose" or "exclusive benefit"
test, which appears to have been fairly narrowly defined, especially as it pertains to those plans
which are designed to invest primarily in employer securities. See S. REP. No. 1090, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 302 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Report] which states that satisfaction of the ERISA
prudence requirement will satisfy the pre-existing, exclusive-benefit rules of the Internal Revenue
Service; Foley & Sussman, The Tax Aspects of Employee Stock Ownershi Plans. The Internal
Revenue Service's Proposed Regulations, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 593, 597 (1977) [hereinafter referred to
as Symposium]; Little & Thrailkill, Fiduciaries Under ERISA." 4 Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Little & Thrailkill]; Note, Fiduciary Standards
and the Prudent Man Rule Under the Employment [sic] Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88
HARV. L. REV. 960, 966 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Note].
13. Section 408(c)(3) of ERISA exempts such dual role functions from the "prohibited trans-
action" provisions of section 406 of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1976). Persons who receive
full-time pay from the sponsoring employer may be paid no compensation but only expenses by
the plan. Id. § 1 108(c)(2). "For example, the plan could provide that the investment committee is
to consist of the persons who serve as the president, vice-president for finance, and comptroller of
the employer." Report, supra note 12, at 298. See also Curren v. Freitag, 432 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.
I11. 1977), where the court held that a fund trustee could simultaneously serve as employer's direc-
tor of labor relations and could counsel employer in pension matters.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 137-38, reh. denied, 409 U.S. 898 (1972).
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tion and the shareholders. 5 The following not uncommon situation
will serve to illustrate a series of potential conflicts.
Assume that a small corporate employer maintains an eligible in-
dividual account retirement plan. The plan, like most small profit-
sharing plans, is administered by a small committee designated by the
employer's board of directors. The plan assets are held in trust by a
bank as trustee, pursuant to a trust agreement.' 6 The trustee is subject
to the direction of the administrator, and either or both of these
fiduciaries are subject to the investment direction of the board of direc-
tors who, more often than not, are the individuals in the corporation
with the most expertise in investment and fiscal policymaking. Assume
also that the plan, an eligible individual account plan, is the largest
shareholder of the employer.'
7
Consider the consequences for the plan fiduciaries when an
outside corporation attempts a take-over. Each member of the board
of directors of the corporation to be acquired has responsibilities in
several potentially different directions.' 8 If, for example, the take-over
bid presents an opportunity for the then current shareholders to profit
substantially from the sale of their stock, and the directors resist the
bid, all the shareholders, including the plan and its participants, could
maintain that the directors acted wrongly, out of self-interest, for their
own survival, or in some other way, and thus failed in their duty to the
shareholders. '9 On the other hand, if the acquiring corporation had
indicated its intention to drastically restructure the to-be-acquired cor-
15. See id at 137 n.14; Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 25
(E.D. Pa. 1940).
16. Section 403(a) of ERISA generally requires plan assets to be held in formal trust, with a
few exceptions. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976).
17. Section 407(a) of ERISA generally prohibits plans from holding or acquiring employer
securities or real property to the extent that the aggregate fair market value thereof exceeds ten
percent of the fair market value of the plan's assets. The prohibition is subject to delayed effective
dates to allow gradual divestiture down to the limit by pre-existing plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)
(1976). Section 407(b), however, has the effect of exempting "eligible individual account plans"
from the ten percent limitation, and section 408(e) exempts such acquisitions for such plans from
the "prohibited transaction" rules of sections 406 and 407 provided that certain conditions are
met. Id. §§ 1107(b), 1108(e). Section 407(d)(3)(A) defines "eligible individual account plan" to
include profit-sharing, stock bonus, thrift, or savings plans, ESOPs and money purchase plans in
existence when ERISA became law (Sept. 2, 1974), and which on said date invested "primarily" in
qualifying employer securities. Id. § 1107(d)(3)(A). Section 407(d)(3)(B), however, requires that
such plans must "explicitly" provide for acquisition and holding of qualifying employer securities
or real property to qualify for the exemption. Id. § 1107(d)(3)(B).
18. Depending upon the circumstances, the directors may also have to consider securities law
or antitrust implications. See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d
125 (1963).
19. Conversely, acceptance of such a bid under highly suspicious and/or inadequately inves-
tigated circumstances--as amid indications of a "looting" attempt-could result in similar liabil-
ity. See, e.g., Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940). The
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poration once it obtained control, resulting in substantial permanent
layoffs of employees, and/or to discontinue the retirement plan, to ac-
cept the take-over bid could breach the duty owed to the plan's partici-
pant-employees by the directors as plan fiduciaries. And, this duty, it
could be argued, includes assuring, so far as feasible, the indefinite con-
tinued existence and viability of the plan and its source of funding so as
to enable it to fulfill its function of providing financially secure retire-
ments for the participants and avoiding unnecessary forfeitures.
20 It
could also be argued that by accepting such a bid, or directing the ad-
ministrators or trustees to accept such a bid, the directors might be vio-
lating another ERISA section which prohibits plan fiduciaries, from
acting "on behalf of a party," such as other shareholders or the second
corporation, "whose interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or
the interests of its participants ... "21
A literal application of the sole interest test would leave the plan
fiduciaries in a take-over situation with unpalatable alternatives. They
could either ignore their sole interest duties with respect to the plan or
ignore their common law duties as corporate or shareholder fiduciaries,
and assume the risk of resulting violations, viewing and acting upon the
matter solely from the point of view of the plan participants-to the
possible damage of other shareholders. Clearly, this anomalous ap-
proach cannot be condoned since one law should not be applied so as
to require an individual to break another law.
It must also be noted that the fiduciary in this situation does not
even have the option of resigning or refusing to act in either his capac-
ity as plan fiduciary or of corporate director in order to avoid the di-
lemma.22 Even if this were a feasible option, an "omission to act" such
as a resignation is, nevertheless, a decision with real, foreseeable conse-
same could be true where antitrust violations are permitted to occur. See Graham v. Allis-Chal-
mers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963).
20. Indeed, the court in Withers v. Teachers' Retirement System, 447 F. Supp. 1248
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 595 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1979) held that such considerations justified, under
common law, investment in New York City obligations by the New York City teachers' retirement
plan. See also Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2) (1976).
22. Under ERISA, mere resignation may well be insufficient in order to avoid liability for a
fiduciary breach. See Question FR-10, ERISA Interpretive Bulletin 75-5, reportedin PENS. PLAN
GUIDE (CCH) 23,855A (1978). Section 405(a)(3) of ERISA requires fiduciaries to make affirma-
tive "reasonable efforts" to remedy breaches by co-fiduciaries in order to avoid liability to them-
selves. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(3) (1976). Moreover, to require "abdication" would seem to require
abandonment by the plan of inexpensive expertise in favor of independent investment managers,
a policy decision not required by ERISA. Even delegation of responsibility does not obviate the
continued need to exercise care and skill, both as to the act of delegation itself and as to subse-
quent overview of the delegate's performance.
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quences. Moreover, to require such a decision could intensify rather
than ease the problem, for it could deprive one or more parties owed a
fiduciary duty of irreplaceable usable knowledge and expertise despite
the express congressional "two-hat loophole" contained in section
408(c)(3) of ERISA.23 Even the common law recognized that in the
absence of bad faith or unreasonable conduct for personal gain, a
trustee could hold, in trust, shares of a corporation of which he served
as officer or director.
24
The above example serves to demonstrate that even in the absence
of willful violations, there are instances in which the sole interest test
cannot or should not be literally applied for sound policy reasons. In a
small plan, there likely will be cases in which it may be relatively clear
what an action "solely in the interest of the participants" would be, but
in which that action might conflict with or violate another legal or equi-
table duty owed by the same individuals, and so cannot or should not
be required.
The logical and practical conclusion to be reached is that in applyi
ing even so seemingly clear a standard as the sole interest test, the
courts and agencies charged with the responsibility of interpreting, ap-
plying and enforcing ERISA must engage in a balancing approach in
cases where the fiduciary owes a duty to competing interests.
In fact, the courts have used an analogous approach in applying
the common law pertaining to the conventional trustee who has had to
balance the competing interests of the remainderman and income bene-
ficiary. There, the trustee must "make such investments, and only such
investments, as a prudent man would make of his own property having
in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity of
the income to be derived. ' 25 The absence of these particular competing
interests simplifies and eases the application of the ERISA rule in as-
sessing the prudence of investments, since there is no longer an urgent
need to judge "an investment alone, without regard to its role in the
total portfolio. '26 However, other competing interests still do exist,
and, in the absence of clearer official direction, plan fiduciaries must be
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1976).
24. See A. SCOTT, ScoTr ON TRUSTS § 170.22 (3d ed. 1967).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959).
26. Address by Ian D. Lanoff, Administrator of Pension and Welfare Benefit Program,
United States Department of Labor, American Bar Association annual meeting, Aug. 10, 1977,
printed in (CCH) Pension Plan Guide 25,177 at 27,342. See also Note, supra note 12, which
argues persuasively for the "whole portfolio" approach to the prudent man rule in light of modern
investment theory and practice. This approach was later adopted by the United States Depart-
ment of Labor.
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permitted to resolve those interests on an equitable basis; the judiciary
and responsible officials should soundly exercise their discretion.
One commentator, mindful of the potential conflict in fiduciary
behavior where employee plans hold employer stock, has gone so far as
to suggest that the ERISA "prudent man" rule should be modified so as
to be applied as follows in the case of an ESOP: "Whatever would be
deemed applicable to a regular stockholder under similar circum-
stances, by direct comparison or analogy. ' 27 While some may argue
that this suggestion goes too far, a case-by-case evolutionary process
should allow for similar exceptions. Ultimately, it may be determined
that the fiduciary duty under ERISA wholly supplants other competing
legal or equitable duties. But corporate vitality and the availability of
capital investors serve as the ultimate fountainhead and financial base
of the private employee benefit system regulated by ERISA. Thus, the
wisdom of a policy selection disfavoring said base is open to question.
It is more sensible to define prospectively the parameters of the sole
interest and similar ERISA standards clearly enough to minimize the
risk that well-meaning, qualified individuals serving in congression-
ally-approved dual roles will be penalized retroactively for failure to
select properly between competing valid interests. The statute refers
only to duties "with respect to a plan." 28 Official interpreters of the
statute must recognize that individuals who serve as fiduciaries often
necessarily have duties to others as well.
THE "PRUDENT MAN" RULE
Under section 404(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, the "prudent man" rule
provides as follows:
A fiduciary shall discharge his duties with the care, skill, prudence
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like
aims. 29
Although the "prudent man" rule can be read to impose a stricter stan-
dard of prudence than that required of common law trustees,30 we sug-
gest that this interpretation is neither required nor itself prudent.
27. Altmann, The Definition of Fiduciary Prudence as Applied to the ESOP-An Economic
Overview, 3 PENS. & PROFIT-SHARING TAX J. 151, 154 (1977).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1976).
29. Id § 1104(a)(1)(B).
30. See The Federal Prudent Man Rule Under ERISA, Address by James D. Hutchinson,
then Administrator of Pension and Welfare Benefit Program, United States Department of Labor,
before the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the American Bar Association Meet-
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The ERISA formulation is not intended to deviate markedly from
the accepted common law standard, and at least one commentator has
suggested that the courts may in fact justifiably so rule. 3' As stated by
the House and Senate conferees in the Joint Explanatory Statement of
the Committee of Conference, the fiduciary standards contained in title
I of ERISA "apply rules and remedies similar to those under tradi-
tional trust law to govern the conduct of fiduciaries. ' 32 Moreover, it is
clear from the legislative history that the House and Senate conferees
did not intend the "prudent man" standard under ERISA to be any
stricter than the common law rules governing trust fiduciaries. Rather,
as stated in the joint explanatory statement, "[tjhe conferees expect that
the courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary
standards) bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of employee
benefit plans."
33
It must be recognized that this "special nature and purpose" refers
to at least two types of employee benefit plans-retirement plans gener-
ally and individual kinds of retirement plans. The investment goals
and strategies perforce vary with the type of plan involved. Typically,
however, fiduciaries responsible for the investment of defined benefit
plan assets have tended to a more conservative, fixed-income approach
than those responsible for defined contribution plans, in view of the
fixed-benefit funding requirements applicable to the former type of
plan.3
4
ing (Aug. 10, 1976), printed in [1976] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 25,119 (ERISA's fiduciary
standards should not be read as requiring an across-the-board "prudent expert" rule).
For a discussion of the common law fiduciary standard of prudence, see the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959); Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830) ("All
that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a
sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their
own 4ffairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds,
considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested." Id
at 461); King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869) ("[T]he just and true rule is, that the trustee is bound to
employ such diligence and such prudence in the care and management, as in general, prudent men
of discretion and intelligence in such matters, employ in their own like affairs." Id at 85-86 (em-
phasis added)).
31. See Note, supra note 12, at 966.
32. See Report, supra note 12, at 295.
33. Id at 302 (emphasis added). See also Little & Thrailkill, supra note 12, at 12-13 which
found a dual standard for small and large plans in the legislative history, citing Klevan, Fiduciary
Responsibility Under ERISA "s Prudent Man Rule. What are the Guideposts?, 44 J. TAX. 152 (1976)
[hereinafter referred to as Klevan], which contains an excellent summary of the "prudent expert"
debate.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (1976). A "defined benefit" plan is typically one wherein a formula or
level of benefits is clearly stated and the employer is responsible for contributing those sums which
have been actuarially determined to provide sufficient funds to pay said benefits when such be-
come payable, with due regard for amortization of unfunded past service liability and experience
losses. See id. § 1002(35) (1976).
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Recently issued final regulations of the United States Department
of Labor appear to be broadly designed to take account of the consider-
ations affecting fiduciary investment duties."- The regulations purport
to provide a "safe harbor" investment approach for fiduciaries to fol-
low, although this is not meant to be an exclusive path to prudence. 3
6
In adopting the regulations, the Department of Labor rejected sugges-
tions that interpretation be left entirely to the courts, or that interpreta-
tion by regulation was impractical.37 The new regulations encourage a
"portfolio-wide" approach to assessing the prudence of plan invest-
ments, 38 and are designed, in part, to avoid complete discouragement
of investments in small or new companies by permitting risk distribu-
tion. 39 The regulations emphasize that the prudence requirement is
met with respect to an investment or investment course of action if:
[T]he fiduciary . . .has given appropriate consideration to those
facts and circumstances that, given the scope of such fiduciary's in-
vestment duties, the fiduciary knows or should know are relevant to
the particular investment or investment course of action involved,
including the role the investment or investment course of action
plays in that portion of the plan's investment portfolio with respect to
which the fiduciary has investment duties; and. . . has acted accord-
ingly.40
Additionally, the following observations made by the Department
of Labor in the preamble to the regulations could be of special impor-
tance to fiduciaries of small plans that hold employer stock:
1. The preamble states that the regulations "[do] not purport to
impose any additional requirements or constraints upon plan
35. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,221-37,225 (1979) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1979)).
36. 44 Fed. Reg. at 37,222; Hutchinson, supra note 12, at 23.
37. 44 Fed. Reg. at 37,222.
38. Id
39. See 44 Fed. Reg. at 37,222 (1979). Such concerns could be crucial to the accumulation of
capital for such companies, given the large portion of available capital that institutional investors
control.
40. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.404a-l(b)(l) (1979). The regulations further provide:
For purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection, 'appropriate consideration' shall
include, but is not necessarily limited to, (A) a determination by the fiduciary that the
particular investment or investment course of action is reasonably designed, as part of
the portfolio (or, where applicable, that portion of the plan portfolio with respect to
which the fiduciary has investment duties), to further the purposes of the plan, taking
into consideration the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain (or other return) associ-
ated with the investment or investment course of action, and (B) consideration of the
following factors as they relate to such portion of the portfolio:
(i) The composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification;
(ii) the liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated cash
flow requirements of the plan; and




fiduciaries."'4 ' Rather, they provide only "a manner of satisfying the
requirements of the 'prudence' rule."' 42 Thus, it would appear that the
regulations are to be flexibly applied in order to accomodate the exi-
gencies of smaller plans.
2. Although "all" relevant facts and circumstances must be con-
sidered, the regulations provide that a fiduciary need not "expend un-
reasonable efforts" 43 or "consider matters outside the scope of [his]
duties,"44 as where investment responsibilities are divided, delegated or
allocated. Here again it would appear that there is to be an accommo-
dation for the inherent limitations of small plan fiduciaries.
3. The regulations "[do] not provide . . . that the assets of a
pooled investment fund may be invested . . . without . . . considera-
tion" 45 of "the particular needs of any individual plan that has an inter-
est in the fund."'46 However, the regulations further specify that the
investments in index funds, if in accordance with general plan objec-
tives and if properly screened, generally will be deemed "prudent.
47
4. Previous consideration of relevant factors will not necessarily
"immunize" subsequent investment decisions.48 Concern over the pru-
dence of investments, therefore, must be a continuing process.
5. "Diversification," according to the regulations, means "a mech-
anism for reducing the risk of large losses."'49 The Department of La-
bor, however, expressly declined to clarify or define "diversification"
any further.50
6. While the characteristics of individual investments must be
considered, the regulations specify that an isolated high-risk investment
is not necessarily imprudent if it is part of a complying portfolio.5"
7. Such factors as the risk to be assumed and the services to be
provided under a contract issued by an insurance company are "perti-
nent to any investment decision involving such contract."
52
41. 44 Fed. Reg. at 37,222.
42. Id
43. Id at 37,223.
44. Id
45. Id (emphasis added).
46. Id
47. Id at 37,224. The legislative history makes it clear that the diversification rule may be
satisfied by investment in a pooled fund which is itself properly diversified. Report, supra note 12,
at 305.
48. 44 Fed. Reg. at 37,223.
49. Id
50. Id at 37,224.
51. Id
52. Id
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8. In response to fears that small plan fiduciaries might be re-
quired to invest in expensive investment services, the preamble to the
regulations states that "it would not seem necessary for a fiduciary of a
plan with assets of $50,000 to employ, in all respects, the same invest-
ment management techniques as would a fiduciary of a plan with assets
of $50,000,000."
3
9. Finally, in a departure from the common law, the regulations
make it clear that the ERISA "prudent man" rule "does not require
that every plan investment produce current income under all circum-
stances."' 54 Presumably, therefore, holding employer stock paying no
dividends or lesser dividends than other investments is not necessarily
imprudent.
As the evolutionary history of the common law of trusts suggests,
it would be unreasonable to expect, and probably unwise to design in
advance, a regulatory definition of the ERISA "prudent man" rule to
answer most questions and conflicts fiduciaries may encounter. Thus,
no matter how assiduously fiduciaries document their apparent compli-
ance with the new regulations, open questions of liability persist be-
cause a number of potential problem areas of special concern to the
small, employer-stock-holding plan fiduciary remain unaddressed.
55
The courts will eventually face these situations as cases arise, but
guidelines can be used to suit the special needs of smaller eligible indi-
vidual account plans.
One potential problem involves the benchmark against which the
conduct of small plan fiduciaries is to be judged. Clearly, if the "pru-
dent expert" standard is to be rejected, as it should be, it makes sense to
utilize a general, comparative standard applied as of the time the in-
vestment decisions are made and under "circumstances then prevail-
ing.",56 It must be noted, however, that a general comparative standard
could well result in a virtual "prudent expert" effect upon the small
plan fiduciary. For example, if the small plan fiduciary is irreplaceable
53. Id (emphasis added).
54. Id at 37,225 (emphasis added). The common law generally required the sale of unpro-
ductive or under-productive property where there was an income beneficiary. See generally RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 240 (1959).
55. Nevertheless, it is still advisable for fiduciaries to document their adherence to the regula-
tory standards, as by minutes of all action taken during policy-decision meetings of the fiduciaries.
See Question FR 10, ERISA Interpretive Bulletin 75-5 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) I 23,855A
(1978).
56. As one commentator has noted: "Courts should look to the efficiency ratios commonly
achieved in the investment community as the principal reference in determining how close an
approximation of the theoretical optimum should be required of fiduciaries." Note, supra note 12,
at 976-77 (footnote omitted).
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or possesses less than optimum resources or experience, a comparative
standard of performance could require financially self-defeating ex-
penditures for professional investment advice or management. More-
over, the comparative standard could require similarly self-defeating
over-reliance upon a provision in ERISA which, in effect, permits plan
sponsors to avoid fiduciary risks by allowing individual plan partici-
pants to exercise control over the assets in their respective individual
accounts. 57 As noted previously,58 there is an indication that the De-
partment of Labor now officially recognizes at least a portion of the
potential problem. 59
A fair reading of the ERISA "prudent man" rule would be to ap-
ply the rule in light of the size and type of plan involved, Z e., "an enter-
prise of like character." Thus, when the courts and government
enforcement attorneys assess the prudence of investments by a small-
plan fiduciary, the benchmark should not be the investment community
at large. Rather, the benchmark should be what the prototypical small-
plan fiduciary (i e., "a prudent man acting in a like capacity") would
have done at the time of the decision in question. Clearly, this involves
subjective judgments and some degree of speculation. However, any
comparative standard involves such factors, and the special standard
suggested may be necessary to avoid the potential destruction of the
small independent plan in favor of an evergrowing mass institutional
investor bloc.60
Diversfication
Another similar potential problem area involves ERISA's "diversi-
fication" requirement contained in section 404(a)(1)(C). 61 The legisla-
tive history makes it clear that there is a rebuttable presumption in
57. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(2) (1976). Excessive use of such provisions could deprive plan par-
ticipants, who are typically unsophisticated in money management matters, of the benefits to be
derived from having their retirement funds invested at the direction of individuals who, while not
necessarily professional money managers themselves, nevertheless offer considerably more sophis-
tication and skill than rank-and-file employee-participants.
58. See text accompanying notes 43, 44, and 53 supra.
59. See Hutchinson supra note 30 (A plan sponsor/trustee managing a small plan with lim-
ited assets, should not be held to the same standard of care as a trust company.).
One gray area that may be the subject of court interpretation is the degree of expertise re-
quired under the Act to be able to discern if and when the services of a professional money
manager are required. The general guidepost, however, should be whether the plan is of a size
and nature that a prudent man would realize that professional help is both needed and can be
afforded. See Klevan, supra note 33, at 154.
60. Experience indicates that, given sufficient investment latitude, a small, independently in-
vested plan may equal or exceed the performance of larger plans.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(C) (1976).
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favor of diversification; in an action for breach of the requirement, af-
ter it is initially demonstrated that there has been a failure to diversify,
the legislative history notes that the defendant must demonstrate that
the failure was prudent and not "clearly prudent."
62
In the case of truly small plans, enforcement of the diversification
rule would seem to require one of two possible conclusions; either
small plans will be forced to invest in pooled diversified investment
funds,63 or the prospective defendant-fiduciary's burden will have to be
liberally construed in his favor. In order to minimize the impact of
investment transaction costs, depending upon the nature of the invest-
ment, the small plan investor must invest larger percentage blocs of the
plan's assets, and/or at less frequent intervals, than in the case of larger
plans.
In some small plans, such as a target-benefit 64 or defined benefit
plan,65 an abundance of caution may dictate the acquisition of rela-
tively risk-free, stable fixed-income investments in blocs high enough to
generate reasonable interest rates. While the investment principal may
be subject to constant erosion by inflation, such a course of action
avoids the risks of massive sudden loss and serious underfunding at-
tendant upon other, more inflation-responsive, growth-oriented invest-
ments. In such a case, it is inequitable for small plan fiduciaries to be
required to diversify to the extent deemed prudent for larger plans to
guard against losses due both to market fluctuation or economic or in-
dustry conditions and to inflation. Indeed, such a diversification re-
quirement for small plan fiduciaries would require speculation inimical
to the plan's-and ERISA's--objectives.
Conversely, unless the small profit-sharing plan is to become little
more than a group form of the Individual Retirement Account, 66 and if
real growth potential is to be permitted such plans, it would seem that
less diversification, and perhaps greater risk, should be permitted than
in the case of larger plans. In fact, these standards derive from the
62. Report, supra note 12, at 304. The report also states: "It is not intended that a more
stringent standard of prudence be established with the use of the term 'clearly prudent.' " Id
63. Id at 305.
64. The term "target benefit" plan commonly refers to a plan (typically adopted prior to the
advent of ERISA) which defines both the amount to be contributed to the plan and the level of
benefits (the "target") to be achieved. Such plans were frequently encountered in collective bar-
gaining situations; unions typically sought statement of the benefit level, whereas employers typi-
cally sought statement of the contribution level so as to limit their future liability for
contributions.
65. See note 34 supra.
66. The Individual Retirement Account is commonly referred to as IRA and is defined in 26
U.S.C. § 408(a) (1976).
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literal wording of the statute wherein it is stated that diversification is
required only "to minimize the risk of large losses. ' ' 67 The liability for
failure to diversify should not be imposed, therefore, where diversifica-
tion (even when "prudent") is not absolutely necessary. It also would
be consistent with the House and Senate Conference Committee's soft-
ened interpretation of the statutory language to interpret the small plan
proviso to section 404(a)(1)(C), in the case of small plans, as requiring
diversification "unless under the circumstances it is 'not clearly pru-
dent' to do S0."68
Plans Holding Employer Stock
There is another especially difficult problem under the ERISA
"prudent man" rule for the fiduciary of an eligible individual account
plan which holds significant shares of the employer's stock. While it is
true that the statute exempts such plans from the diversification re-
quirement, at least to the extent of such employer stock holdings, 69 it
explicitly does not exempt such holdings from the rest of the prudence
requirement. 70 How the courts choose to treat this seeming anomaly
may well determine whether plans continue to hold employer stock.7 1
The fiduciaries of eligible individual account plans may have impossi-
ble choices to make unless the courts go further than even the broad
interpretations that Congress appears to have intended.
The range of alternatives open to the individual account plan
fiduciary may depend upon the precise language contained in the plan
provisions authorizing employer stock holdings.72 Plan language mer-
elyprovidingfor the acquisition and holding of employer stock leaves
more discretion to, and creates greater risk for, the fiduciary than plan
language which requires the acquisition and holding of employer stock
with lower and upper limits for such holdings. Therefore, the em-
ployer-plan sponsor may be able to draft out wholesale chunks of
fiduciary liability without ever resorting to the type of exculpatory lan-
guage now made void by section 410(a) of ERISA. Indeed, plan provi-
67. 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(1)(C) (1976).
68. The common law was not entirely clear as to diversification. See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 228 (1959); A. SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS §§ 228, 230.3 (3d ed.
1967).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (1976). See note 17 supra.
70. Id See also Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 459-60 (10th Cir. 1978).
71. Hutchinson, When Employee Beneft Plans Invest Assets in the Employer's Stock, NAT'L.
L.J. 30-31 (Nov. 13, 1978).
72. These provisions are required by section 407(d)(3)(B) of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)
(3)(B) (1976).
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sions can be designed to limit or mandate generally the fiduciary's
range of investment options as well as to limit specifically his ability to
dispose of employer stock. In fact, under common law, trust settlors
had broad drafting power to either limit or expand both the trustees'
powers and their exposure to liability.
73
This approach would seem to draw support from the statutory re-
quirement that a fiduciary discharge his duties "in accordance with the
documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such docu-
ments and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this sub-
chapter."' 74 This clause may, however, cut two ways. The unanswered
question is whether a plan document, drafted as described above, is
consistent with ERISA or in contravention of it. There is clear indica-
tion in a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit that the latter may be so. In Eaves v. Penn , 75 the defend-
ant, Penn, converted a profit-sharing plan into an ESOP and used the
ESOP as a vehicle to finance his purchase of control of the employer-
sponsor. The Tenth Circuit held that in recommending, designing, and
implementing amendment of the plan, given the "unique circum-
stances" of the case, Penn had acted as a fiduciary under section 404(a)
of ERISA. 76 The court cited specific legislative history in concluding
that such employer-financing schemes violate ERISA's "exclusive ben-
efit requirement.
'77
The court's statement that the circumstances in Eaves were
"unique" should prevent the wholesale extension of the doctrine
therein stated where such financing schemes are not involved, as would
be true in the case of the typical "eligible" profit-sharing plan. More-
over, it must be noted that the law already contains adequate prohibi-
tions against employer stock transactions for inadequate
consideration. 78 Finally, although ERISA does not require an em-
ployer to establish a benefit plan for its employees, it is urged that
73. It was common for pre-ERISA pension and profit-sharing trusts to take advantage of the
common law rule that, by trust provision, a trustor could relieve trustees of liability for breach of
trust (other than due to bad faith, intentional breaches, and the like). See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959). Similarly, of course, trustees could be endowed with powers be-
yond normal legal limits, or with powers less broad than the law normally permitted.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 104(a)(l)(D) (1976). This section is enforceable under section 502 of ER-
ISA. Id. § 1132.
75. 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978).
76. Id at 458. See Pavlock, Recent Labor Department Suit Applies the Fiduciary Duty Stan-
dards of ERISA-Anaysis of Usery v. Penn., 3 PENS. & PROFIT-SHARING TAX J. 139, 143-44
(1977) (criticizing a similar conclusion by the district court).
77. See 587 F.2d at 459-60.
78. Such prohibitions include section 408(e) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e) (1976), and the
Internal Revenue Service's exclusive benefit rule. See Symposium, supra note 12, at 597.
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where an employer does establish a plan, only statutory restrictions
clearly stated in advance should be permitted to alter the employer-
trustor's intent.
However, what if an employer is either unable or unwilling to tie
his plan's fiduciary's (or his own) hands through strict draftmanship in
advance or by subsequent plan amendment which would be subject to
IRS approval? Then, under what circumstances is it prudent for an
eligible individual account plan to hold or acquire qualifying employer
securities, where the plan has been designed, at least in part, to confer
an ownership interest in the employer upon the participants?
It has been aptly noted that in the case of ESOPs, which may even
be a somewhat less difficult situation than an eligible profit-sharing
plan, that:
[a] dilemma arises if the qualifying employer securities begin to ap-
pear to be a poor investment. The fiduciaries are responsible for a
plan specifically established to invest primarily in stocks that are now
an unsound investment. The question is whether they must liquidate
the plan's holdings of employer securities: how poor an investment
must an employer's stock become before the fiduciaries would be re-
quired to dispose of it?
7 9
There is a similar dilemma presented by the take-over bid example
stated earlier with reference to the sole interest test.80 In that instance,
the unanswered question is whether the fiduciary is required to sell em-
ployer stock because an unusual opportunity for the plan to profit
thereon is presented.
In the future, there may be an alleviation of this dilemma by con-
gressional action which may occur, if not in the case of profit-sharing
plans, at least as to ESOPs, 8 t or even by expansion of current prudent
man regulations. Presently, however, the Department of Labor, if not
the Congress, appears reluctant to resolve the problem. Until a resolu-
tion is forthcoming, the answer would appear to lie in a particularly
restrained application of the "prudent man" rule in cases involving the
retention or disposition of employer stock.82 It is, of course, technically
79. Symposium, supra note 12, at 547. The article also reports the introduction of H.R. 5577,
94th Cong., ist Sess. (1975), which would have provided for conclusively presumptive satisfaction
of the fiduciary requirements where an ESOP acquires or holds employer stock. As the sympo-
sium notes: "the major purposes of the Act are antithetical to many of the operating concepts of
ESOPs."
80. See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
81. Symposium, supra note 12, at 551-52.
82. Although ERISA makes no such specific provision, we presume that, as would have been
the case at common law, ERISA fiduciaries will be permitted to resort to the courts for direction
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impossible to ignore Congress' express provision that the general pru-
dence requirements apply to employer stock. 83 However, since both
the legislative history and the statutory scheme indicate a congressional
intent to preserve employer-stock-holding plans, it seems reasonable to
conclude that a particularly limited application of the prudence re-
quirements must be made. It is only by providing such plans the neces-
sary "breathing room," and by allowing their design to be fully
honored, that they can be expected to continue to exist.
The disposition of employer stock by eligible individual account
plans that meet the other non-prudence ERISA requirements should be
required, as a matter of prudence, only where it seems likely that reten-
tion would destroy the plan, defeat the purpose of the plan's employer-
stockholding design, or impede full payment of benefits to participants.
This would include situations where the employer is on the verge of
collapse and the fiduciary's action is therefore necessary in order to
help preserve both the funding source of the plan and the employment
source of the employee-participants, or where absolutely required by
the liquidity needs of the plan for benefit payments. 84 Failure to recog-
nize the inherently limited nature of the prudent man rule as applied to
employer stock held by eligible individual account plans could well
sound the death-knell for such plans. The rule, therefore, should be
applied to force the fiduciary's hand only where the plan or the em-
ployer's death-knell would sound in any event, and where the com-
mands of the plan's terms would otherwise cease to be effective through
self-destruction.
CONCLUSION
We have not intended to exhaust herein the range of special
problems facing fiduciaries of small and/or eligible individual account
plans. Rather, our goal has been to highlight several such potential
problems which we have seen and to suggest possible ways of stemming
the tide of resulting confusion which appears to have affected both em-
ployer clients and government regulatory agencies. ERISA continues
where there is a reasonable doubt as to the appropriate course of action to follow. See 3 A.
SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 259 (3d ed. 1967). Even if such suits may be entertained, the rapidity
of market fluctuations and the expense of federal litigation may prohibit such resort, especially in
the case of smaller plans.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (1976).
84. The same rationale could apply to permit the acquisition of low-rated employer securi-
ties. See Withers v. Teachers' Retirement System, 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 595
F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1979).
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to visit growing pains upon those to whom it applies. However, a crea-
tive application will engender more growth than pain, consonant with
the goal of regulating, rather than defeating, the growth of American
private employee benefit plans.
